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Abstract
This paper explores the role of monetary policy in Zimbabwe’s hyperinflation 
episode, using the Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) and Error Correction 
Model (ECM) approaches with monthly data from 2006:01 to 2008:07. Results 
from both the ECM and ARDL approaches show that during the study period, 
hyperinflation was caused by expansionary monetary policy, the exchange 
rate premium and inflation expectations for both the short and long-term. 
Zimbabwe’s hyperinflation episode brings to the fore the importance of ensuring 
that the Central Bank is independent in executing its mandate of influencing the 
monetary policy process in a manner that ensures price stability.  
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Zimbabwe experienced relatively low inflation levels between 1980 and 1990, 
partly explained by a system of administrative controls on the product, foreign 
exchange and labour markets (Chhibber et al. 1989). Inflation averaged 13 per 
cent between 1980 and 1990, before rising to around 20 per cent during the 
first phase (1991-1995) of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) supported 
Economic and Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP). A combination of 
factors could have explained the rise in inflation during the first phase of ESAP 
and these were, among others, the removal of price controls; and monetisation of 
fiscal deficits (RBZ, 1996; Saunders, 1996; Economist Intelligence Unit, 1999). 
An economic crisis set in Zimbabwe in 1997, triggered by both internal and 
external disequilibria (IMF, 2001; Ndlela, 2011). The economy, which had 
registered real gross domestic product growth of 9.6 per cent in 1996, slowed 
down to 1.4 per cent in 1997 and declined to an estimated -14.8 per cent in 2008. 
Major factors that affected economic performance included rising production 
costs, cash-flow difficulties, foreign exchange shortages, weakening demand 
due to declining real incomes, and shortages of raw materials and spare parts 
for machinery and equipment (RBZ 2009). 
Coorey et al. (2007) posit that the Zimbabwean economy contracted as a 
result of high inflation levels and price distortions caused by extensive controls 
on product and foreign exchange markets, among others. In addition, the lack 
of external financing, coupled with the loss in investor confidence caused by 
policy inconsistencies also contributed to the contraction in output (Coorey et 
al., 2007). These views were corroborated by Besada and Moyo (2008); IMF 
(2009) and World Bank (2009). 
The sustained decline in the Zimbabwean economy, coupled with high 
inflation, led to the engagement in quasi-fiscal activities, by the Reserve Bank of 
Zimbabwe (RBZ). The quasi-fiscal activities of the RBZ included the provision 
of subsided credit to productive sectors of the economy, unrealised foreign 
exchange losses and liquidity support to troubled banks, among others (Munoz, 
2007; Munangagwa, 2009). The country’s central bank engaged in quasi-fiscal 
activities in the belief that this would increase output and dampen inflationary 
pressures (RBZ, 2008). The level of money creation by the central bank was, 
however, unrelated to economic activity and it intensified during the period 
2005 to 2008, resulting in excessive monetary expansion and a surge in inflation 
(Mandishara and Mupamhadzi, 2016).
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Zimbabwe’s inflation spiral effectively got out of control in late 2007 to early 
2008 (IMF, 2009), reflecting significant recourse to the monetisation of fiscal 
deficits and the impact of the quasi-fiscal activities of the central bank. The RBZ 
also printed money to buy foreign exchange on the parallel market, eventually 
becoming a very active stakeholder in that market (MacGarry, 2007). Year-on-
year inflation rose to unprecedented levels, peaking at 231.2 million per cent in 
July 2008 (ZIMSTAT, 2008) and 500 billion per cent in December 2008 (IMF, 
2009). Concomitantly, annual money supply growth also increased, peaking at 
431 quintillion per cent by end December 2008 (RBZ, 2008). 
There have been insightful analyses on hyperinflation in Zimbabwe, for 
example, Coorey et al. (2007) and Hanke  (2008), but these studies are largely 
qualitative and do not empirically determine the role of monetary policy 
in Zimbabwe’s hyperinflation episode. The study by McIndoe (2009), while 
quantitative, also does not specifically analyse the role of monetary policy in 
Zimbabwe’s hyperinflation episode. This, therefore, presents a gap which this 
study attempts to bridge.
The analyses in this paper use the Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) 
bounds testing estimation approach introduced by Pesaran et al. (2001) and 
applied in studies such as Pahlavani and Rahimi (2009); Irefin and Yaaba 
(2011); Khatun and Ahamad (2012); and Shittu, Yemitan and Yaya (2012). 
Monthly data from 2006:1 to 2008:07 make up the sample period of study. The 
relationship between the consumer price index and key variables is examined 
to determine the role of monetary policy in the hyperinflation episode for both 
the short and long run. Key independent variables include broad money supply, 
parallel market exchange rate premium, interest rate, output gap and lagged 
consumer price index.
The study finds that expansionary monetary policy, the exchange rate premium 
and inflation expectations caused hyperinflation in Zimbabwe during the study 
period. These findings are in line with other findings on causes of inflation in 
some African countries. In a study where they assessed whether Zambia is 
ready for inflation targeting, Simatele, Schaling and Alagidede (2015) found 
that inflation in Zambia was attributed to the monetisation of fiscal deficits, 
excessive money supply growth as well as exchange rate and supply side shocks. 
Akinbobola (2012) empirically analysed the impact of fluctuations in money 
supply and exchange rates on inflation in Nigeria and found that the expansion 
of money supply caused inflation in the short run.   
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The subsequent sections are presented as follows: Section 2 gives a historical 
perspective on Zimbabwe’s road to hyperinflation; Section 3 discusses the 
conduct of monetary policy in Zimbabwe (1980-2012), while Section 4 
covers the literature review and Section 5 the data, model and methodology. 
The analysis of the results is given in Section 6 and the summary and policy 
recommendations of the study in Section 7.    
2. The road to Zimbabwe's hyperinflation episode: A historical perspective
Most hyperinflations experienced around the world were preceded by a 
combination of high public expenditures, low tax revenues, large debt service 
payments on a large stock of debt and the inability of government to continue 
borrowing from external sources (Sachs 1986; Cardoso 1989; Dem et al. 2001; 
Reinhart et al. 2003; Bittencourt 2010). Likewise, these conditions preceded 
Zimbabwe’s hyperinflation episode. The initial shock emanated from a fall 
in tax revenue, following the decline in world commodity prices of gold and 
tobacco, the country’s main export commodities, coupled with an increase in the 
import price of oil (RBZ, 2000). 
Zimbabwe’s hyperinflation episode began when the month-on-month 
inflation peaked at 50.5 per cent in March 2007, conforming to the Cagan 
(1956:25) arbitrary definition which characterises “hyperinflation as beginning 
in the month the rise in prices exceeds 50 per cent and as ending in the month 
before the monthly rise in price drops below that amount and stays there for 
at least a year”. The onset of the hyperinflation episode followed an economic 
crisis which began during the last quarter of 1997. A combination of entrenched 
economic structural rigidities, which were not successfully addressed during the 
ESAP and other successive economic reform programmes, as well as inherent 
inconsistencies in macro-economic policies, particularly in fiscal issues, in 
large part, triggered the economic crisis (IMF, 1999). The economic crisis 
was exacerbated by external sector imbalances. Consequently, gross domestic 
product declined by about 30 per cent during the period 1999-2007 (Munoz, 
2007; Moss and Patrick, 2007), and by more than 50 per cent between 1999 and 
2008 (RBZ, 2009; IMF, 2009).
Acute balance of payments pressures began to be experienced in Zimbabwe 
during the last quarter of 1997, as export earnings declined (IMF, 1999). The 
external imbalance was worsened by the suspension of balance of payments 
support by the IMF (RBZ, 2006). The IMF suspended support to Zimbabwe in 
1998, following the country’s involvement in the Democratic Republic of Congo 
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conflict which undermined economic performance and investor confidence (IMF 
2001; Kairiza 2012). In addition, the Government of Zimbabwe (GOZ) gave in 
to the demands for pay-outs by the veterans of the country’s war of liberation 
and decided to meet the pay-outs through raising income taxes in the 1998 fiscal 
year. The plan of financing the pay-outs through an increase in income taxes 
was abandoned after the main labour union, the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade 
Unions, vehemently resisted it. This resulted in the unbudgeted expenditure 
being financed by the central bank, through printing, to the tune of Z$2 billion 
or about US$180 million (Kairiza, 2012). These large and unbudgeted pay-outs 
to veterans of the war of liberation subjected the local currency to speculative 
attacks (IMF, 1999; Kairiza, 2012).
The Zimbabwe dollar (Z$) came under severe pressure in late 1997, following 
the huge injection of liquidity into the economy, coupled with uncertainties 
pertaining to the implementation of the land reform programme (IMF 2001; 
Kovanen 2004; Kairiza 2012). Consequently, the Z$ depreciated to Z$18.6 per 
US$ by December 1997, from Z$12.5 at the end of October 1997 and Z$10.8 
at the beginning of 1997 (IMF, 1999). The country’s foreign currency reserves 
fell from 3 months of import cover in 1996 to 0.8 months by the end of 1997, 
as the central bank tried to prop up the depreciating local currency (Coomer and 
Gstraunthaler, 2011).
Zimbabwe’s economic crisis was also partly explained by the way the country 
implemented its land reform programme (IMF, 2001; Sachikonye, 2002; 
Raftopoulos and Phimister, 2003). The land reform programme was meant to 
address the historical imbalance in land ownership, where the minority white 
commercial farmers owned large tracts of productive land, while the indigenous 
black majority were largely peasant farmers who owned small and unproductive 
pieces of land (GOZ, 1983; 1986 and 1998; Moyo and Skalness, 1990; Human 
Rights Watch, 2002; Chitiyo, 2000; UNDP, 2002; Richardson, 2005; Embassy 
of Zimbabwe, 2009). In view of this, the GOZ and international donors 
convened a Land Donor Conference on land reform in Zimbabwe in September 
1998. The outcome of the conference was the commitment by the GOZ to 
implement the land reform programme in an orderly manner, with international 
donor assistance (IMF, 2001). The donors and the GOZ agreed that land reform 
would be guided by some basic principles which included poverty alleviation, 
adherence to the rule of law, involvement of beneficiaries and consultation with 
concerned stakeholders (IMF, 2001).
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In a move against what had been agreed at the September 1998 Land Donor 
Conference, the GOZ implemented a “Fast Track” land reform programme in 
2000, in a manner often characterised by violence against white commercial 
farmers and their workers (Sachikonye, 2002; Dansereau, Zamponi and Melber, 
2005; Besada and Moyo, 2008; Munangagwa, 2011). This followed the April 
2000 commercial farm invasions led by veterans of the war of liberation 
(Raftopoulos and Phimister, 2003; Saunders, 2011).
The Fast Track land reform programme was also launched as a reaction to the 
defeat of the government in the February 2000 Referendum on a proposed new 
constitution (IMF, 2001; Dansereau, Zamponi and Melber, 2005; Besada and 
Moyo, 2008). The GOZ viewed the defeat as having been caused by the support 
given to the main opposition party, the Movement for Democratic Change, by 
the white commercial farmers backed by Western governments, with the aim of 
reversing the gains of the war of liberation (Raftopoulos and Phimister, 2003). 
The disruption of production on the commercial farms adversely affected 
agricultural output, with multiplier effects on other sectors of the economy, 
including manufacturing, mining and tourism (Zimbabwe Democracy Institute, 
2015). According to Richardson (2005), Zimbabwe’s land reform programme 
led to a 12.5 per cent annual fall in gross domestic product, on average, during 
the period 2000 to 2003. The IMF (2009); Montier (2013) and the World Bank 
(2016) estimate that agricultural output fell by more than 50 per cent between 
2000 and 2008, following the implementation of the land reform programme.  
As a result of the low agriculture output, the manufacturing sector, which 
is mainly composed of agro-processing, took a huge knock. The shortages 
of food and other necessities due to the decreased output from farming and 
manufacturing ratcheted up the inflation level, as the economy was forced to 
rely on imports to feed the country (Umer, 2010). The collapse of the agriculture 
system impacted negatively on foreign currency generation, precipitating an 
external debt overhang (Umer, 2010). In addition, the often violent manner 
in which the land reform programme was implemented also resulted in the 
suspension of aid by Western donor nations and organisations (IMF, 2001; 
Besada and Moyo, 2008), deepening the economic crisis.
The economic crisis was also characterised by high levels of money supply 
growth. An accelerated growth in monetary aggregates occurred during the first 
half of 1999, due to the monetisation of fiscal deficits. The RBZ responded 
by tightening monetary policy through the doubling of statutory reserve 
requirements for commercial banks to 30 per cent, to be met on a daily basis, 
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as opposed to weekly averaging (RBZ, 1999). In addition, the margin between 
the rate at which commercial banks borrowed from the RBZ and the effective 
Treasury bill rate was increased by 5 percentage points to prevent arbitrage 
opportunities (RBZ, 1999; IMF, 2001). The tightening of monetary policy 
resulted in a slowdown in broad money growth from 54 per cent in July 1999 to 
30 per cent by end of 1999 (RBZ, 2000).  
Monetary policy was, however, substantially eased during the year 2000, 
resulting in the growth in broad money from 30 per cent by end 1999 to 59.9 
per cent by end 2000 (RBZ, 2001; IMF, 2001). The monetisation of fiscal 
deficits by the GOZ also continued in 2000, against the background of the lack 
of access to foreign lines of credit by government, severely constraining the 
conduct of monetary policy (IMF, 2001). The relaxation of monetary policy 
included the capping of the Bank rate at 2.5 percentage points above the year-
on-year inflation and capping of Treasury bill yields at 1 per cent below the 
Bank rate. In addition, the RBZ directed commercial and merchant banks to 
on-lend half of their statutory reserve requirements to exporters at 30 per cent. 
This was against a Bank rate and annual inflation of 56 per cent and 54 per cent, 
respectively (IMF, 2001). Productive sectors of the economy also accessed loans 
from statutory reserves at 30 per cent through the Productive Sector Facility 
(RBZ, 2000; IMF, 2001). 
As the economic crisis deepened, the Z$ was devalued by 24 per cent in 
August 2000 to trade at Z$50 per US$1. The RBZ promised to make periodic 
adjustments to the exchange rate, in line with inflation differentials between 
Zimbabwe and her major trading partners. However, the pace of adjustments 
was not in line with inflation differentials, resulting in the sharp depreciation of 
the Z$ on the parallel market (IMF, 2001). While the exchange rate was adjusted 
to Z$55 per US$1 in August 2000, on the official foreign exchange market, the 
parallel exchange rate was about Z$300 per US$1. The high parallel market 
premium put pressure on prices since the majority of firms in the productive 
sectors of the economy sourced foreign currency from the parallel market, to 
import raw materials. 
Figure 1 shows a widening gap between the parallel and official exchange 
rate as the official rate was fixed at Z$55 per US$1, from August 2000 to 
January 2003, before being adjusted to Z$824 per US1, from February 2003 
to December 2003. The parallel market rate, however, continued on an upward 
trend, increasing from Z$69 per US$1 in August 2000 to Z$6 100 per US$1 by 
end December 2003. 
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FiGure 1: z$/uS$ exChanGe rate developmentS (jan 2000 - deC 2003)
Source: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2004
The Z$ depreciated by more than 300 per cent in January 2004, following 
the introduction of the foreign exchange auction system, a transitional measure 
towards the introduction of a market determined exchange rate system. As shown 
in Figure 2, the gap between the parallel and official exchange rate widened 
during the period November 2004 and December 2005, as the official exchange 
rate was, to some extent, managed by the central bank. 
FiGure 2: z$/uS$ exChanGe rate developmentS (jan 2004 - deC 2005)
Source: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2006
The economy experienced expansionary monetary policy in 2001, following 
the unilateral restructuring of domestic debt by government (IMF, 2001). The 
GOZ made the unilateral decision to involuntarily redeem 91- day Treasury 
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Bills held by the banking system and individuals, resulting in a steep increase 
in liquidity. This, coupled with the heavy monetisation of fiscal deficits, led to 
the collapse of interest rates from 65 per cent at end of 2000 to 14 per cent in 
January 2001 (IMF, 2001). Consequently, inflation accelerated from 55.2 per 
cent by end December 2000 to 112.1 per cent by end December 2001. Reserve 
money expanded by 150 per cent as at end September 2001, a seven fold 
increase compared to the same period in 2000 (IMF, 2001). The GOZ attempted 
to contain inflation by introducing direct price controls in 2001, resulting in the 
shortage of basic commodities.
The economic crises deepened, with economic conditions continuing to 
deteriorate during 2002 and 2003. There was also political turmoil following 
the disputed March 2002 presidential elections, viewed by the international 
community as not free and fair. A confluence of factors that included 
expansionary fiscal and monetary policies, imposition of administrative controls 
and the maintenance of a fixed exchange exacerbated the economic crisis (IMF, 
2003). In addition, highly negative real interest rates fuelled credit expansion 
and inflation. Broad money grew by 165 per cent in 2002, up from 20 per cent 
in 2001, as a result of loose monetary policy (IMF, 2003). 
Liquidity expansion also emanated from quasi-fiscal operations of the RBZ, 
which provided a subsidy to tobacco and gold producers in the form of preferential 
exchange rates. The foreign exchange subsidies provided by the RBZ amounted 
to 5 per cent of GDP in 2002 (IMF, 2003). Real interest rates remained highly 
negative, despite attempts by the RBZ to raise them between February and March 
2003. Private sector credit also expanded, following the maintenance of a dual 
interest policy where credit to productive sectors was availed at highly negative 
real rates (IMF, 2003). Parallel market exchange rates depreciated sharply, against 
the background of deteriorating macroeconomic conditions. 
The country’s external sector position remained precarious during the period 1997 
to 2008, against the background of declining export performance, increased imports 
and declining capital inflows (RBZ, 2012). As a result, the country was unable to 
settle its external debt obligations, resulting in the accumulation of external payment 
arrears which stood at US$3 071.4 million by the end of 2008 (RBZ, 2010). The 
current account remained under tremendous pressure, with the country recording a 
deficit of US$818.9 million in 1997 and US$778.6 million in 2008 (RBZ, 2010). 
Figure 3 shows export and import values and the current account balance for the 
period 1997 to 2008. The unfavourable external position had an adverse impact on 
the external value of the local currency which continued to fall.
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 FiGure 3: Current aCCount BalanCe (1997 - 2008)
Source: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2009
A new governor took over at the RBZ in December 2003, announcing a 
raft of monetary policy tightening measures. Access to RBZ liquidity support 
was tightened and reserve requirements increased from 20 to 30 per cent 
for commercial and merchant banks and 5 to 15 per cent for finance houses, 
effective January 2004 (RBZ, 2003). The new measures resulted in an increase 
in interbank rates and a collapse of the stock market. Inflation declined from 
598.7 per cent in December 2003 to 132.8 per cent in December 2004. The tight 
monetary stance was, however, not sustained as the RBZ simultaneously injected 
liquidity into the financial system through the Productive Sector Finance (PSF) 
facility at a concessional rate of 30 per cent. A Troubled Bank Fund (TBF) was 
also introduced with effective interest rates of 800 to 1 150 per cent (IMF, 2004), 
as some banks began to experience significant stress situations, following the 
tight monetary policy stance. The TBF came second to exchange losses as a 
major contributor to reserve money growth in 2004 (Munoz, 2007). 
Quasi-fiscal operations of the central bank, which were extended to include 
the Parastatal Reorientation Program (PARP); Local Authorities Reorientation 
Program (LARP); Productive Sector Facility (PSF); Agricultural Sector 
Productivity Enhancement Facility (ASPEF); and Tobacco, Gold and Cotton 
Support programs intensified in 2005. Funding for the PSF, which was introduced 
in 2003, was from statutory reserves at interest rates of 30 per cent, compared 
to market rates of 600 per cent (IMF, 2004). The inception of ASPEF took place 
in June 2005 and was available at an interest rate of 20 per cent, before the 
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rate was reviewed upwards to 50 per cent in April 2006. ASPEF and PSF were 
effectively financed through printing as the statutory reserves from which the 
lending was supposed to be sourced fell short of the financing requirements of 
the programs (Munoz, 2007). The RBZ incurred quasi-fiscal losses estimated at 
75 per cent of GDP, compared to the not more than 10 per cent in most countries 
(Munoz, 2007).
The huge outlays of quasi-fiscal activities of the RBZ overtook conventional 
government deficits as a source of soaring inflation, jeopardising the control of 
monetary expansion (Munoz, 2007). Credit creation by the central bank led to 
rapid expansion in both reserve and broad money. Reserve money expanded 
from 147.4 per cent in January 2005 to 454.1 per cent in December 2005, 
while broad money grew from 176 per cent in January 2005 to 520 per cent in 
December 2005 (RBZ, 2006). Inflation also rose from 133.6 per cent in January 
2005 to 585 per cent in December 2005 (ZIMSTAT, 2006). 
The response of the GOZ to rising inflation included price and wage freezes, 
the most famous of which was the decree instituted in June 2007, forcing 
businesses to slash prices by 50 per cent. This resulted in acute shortages of 
basic goods in formal shops which became only available in the informal 
market at higher prices, elevating inflation. In his famous speech, “How Not to 
Stop Inflation”, Milton Friedman (1966) posited that quick fixes such as wage 
and price freezes, without solving the fundamental problem of excessive money 
printing only lead to higher inflation. Price control in Zimbabwe led to even 
higher levels of inflation. 
Monetary expansion continued through 2006, 2007 and 2008, as the Central 
Bank printed money to finance all sectors of the economy. Annual money 
supply growth expanded from 1 416 per cent in December 2006 to 64 113 per 
cent in December 2007, before peaking at 431 quintillion per cent in December 
2008 (RBZ, 2009). Concomitantly, inflation also rose from 1 281.1 per cent in 
December 2006 to 66 212.3 per cent in December 2007 and 231 million per 
cent by end July 2008 (ZIMSTAT, 2008). According to IMF (2009) estimates, 
inflation peaked at 500 billion per cent in December 2008.
Hyperinflation eroded the value of the Z$, creating serious transactional 
challenges which forced the RBZ to rebase it. The currency was rebased three 
times through the removal of three, ten and twelve zeros in August 2006, August 
2008 and January 2009, respectively. Zimbabwe made history by issuing a 
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one hundred trillion dollars note in early 2009, the largest denomination ever 
issued, as hyperinflation rendered the Z$ worthless (Federal Reserve Bank of 
Dallas, 2011). The one hundred trillion dollar note was, however, rejected by the 
transacting public as the informal use of foreign currencies intensified.  
The latter half of 2008 saw the unofficial replacement of the Z$ by foreign 
currencies in transactions amid the hyperinflation episode (Ndlela, 2008; IMF, 
2009; Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, 2011; Coomer and Gastraunthaler, 2011; 
Kairiza, 2012). The GOZ realised that it had lost the battle of forcing economic 
agents to transact in a currency that could not fulfil any of the functions of 
money and adopted the multi-currency system in February 2009. The adoption 
of the multi-currency system brought both the quasi-fiscal operations of the 
central bank and the hyperinflation episode to an abrupt end.
3. The conduct of monetary policy in Zimbabwe (1980-2012)
The evolution of Zimbabwe’s monetary policy framework in the post-
independence period from 1980 to 2012 can be categorised into five distinct 
phases, namely; the control regime of the 1980s, when monetary policy was 
passive; the shift in monetary policy strategy from controls towards monetary 
targeting of the early 1990s, where the operational target was net domestic assets; 
the shift towards reserve money targeting in the mid-1990s (Muzulu and Mkwebu, 
1986; Mabika, 2001; Tarinda, 2002); the central bank quasi-fiscal activities of 
2004 to 2008; and formalisation of dollarisation in February 2009 (Chigumira 
and Makochekanwa, 2014). Notwithstanding the shifts to various monetary 
policy stances, the RBZ did not have operational independence because it was 
required by statute (Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe Act [Chapter 22:15] to consult 
with the Ministry of Finance in formulating and implementing monetary policy. 
The control regime of the period 1980 to early 1990s was characterised 
by financial repression which advocated for, among other things, controls on 
interest rates and foreign exchange allocation (Mabugu and Mumbengegwi, 
2002; Ndlela, 2011; Mpofu and Matsika, 2013; Kararach et al, 2016). The RBZ 
used interest rate policy to control credit expansion and in this regard would use 
the Bank rate, to influence the level of lending rates (Mabika, 2001). Despite 
being heavily suppressed by controls, money supply and inflation grew steadily, 
partially reflecting the monetisation of fiscal budget deficits. Average growth in 
broad money supply and year-on-year inflation were 17 per cent and 12.8 per 
cent, respectively, during the period 1980 to 1990 (Mabika, 2001). 
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The First Phase of the ESAP, implemented from 1991 to 1995, saw the 
removal of direct controls on interest rates, with prominence being given to 
the use of indirect instruments of monetary policy (RBZ, 1996). The RBZ’s 
monetary policy strategy shifted to one based on targeting intermediate monetary 
aggregates, such as M1, M2 and M3. M1 consists of notes and coins in circulation 
and demand deposits, M2 is M1 plus savings and short term deposits, and M3 is 
M2 plus long term deposits. Open market operations and a flexible interest-rate 
policy became the principal instruments through which monetary policy was 
implemented. Variances in day to day money market conditions were indicated 
by the overnight accommodation rate. The rediscount rate reflected the RBZ’s 
medium term view of inflationary trends (RBZ, 1996). 
The RBZ, however, observed that targeting net domestic assets could not 
contain inflation because of the weak link between net domestic assets and 
domestic inflation. In this regard, the central bank shifted to reserve-money 
targeting, drawing from empirical evidence in other countries that indicated a 
stable relationship between reserve money and broad money supply (M3). This 
monetary policy stance had also been agreed with the IMF under the 1998/1999 
Stand-By Facility. Under the reserve money targeting regime, the central bank 
fixed the level of reserve money consistent with the targeted level of M3. 
Notwithstanding the change in the monetary policy stance, inflation continued to 
increase, reaching nearly 60 per cent by 1999. The use of reserve-money targets 
was short-lived because government spending exceeded agreed targets, forcing 
the RBZ to finance the fiscal deficits and abandon reserve-money targeting.
The abandonment of monetary reforms was conspicuous in 2001, when the 
GOZ manipulated the yield on Treasury bills in an endeavour to contain the 
rising fiscal deficit. As shown in Figure 4, the 90 day Treasury bill rate and the 
inflation rate had been moving in tandem before the GOZ made the unilateral 
decision to redeem the Treasury bills held by the banking system and members 
of the public in January 2001. This resulted in a steep increase in liquidity which 
caused the Treasury bill rate to fall drastically. The 90-day Treasury bill rate 
which stood at around 48 per cent in early January 2001 fell to 10 per cent by 
the end of April 2001. This was against an annual inflation rate of 70 per cent, 
thus pushing real interest rates into strongly negative territory.
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FiGure 4: inFlation and 91 day treaSury Bill rate (1997 - 2002)
Source: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2003
The RBZ continued implementing expansionary monetary policies in 2001, 
against a background of rising inflation and rapid expansion in money supply. 
Figures 5 and 6 show that money supply and inflation both on an upward trend, 
were closely correlated during the period from 1997 to 2006. Money supply 
grew from 83.5 per cent in September 2001 to 124.3 per cent in September 2002 
(RBZ, 2002). Annual inflation was also on upward trend, rising from 86.2 per 
cent in September 2001 to 144.2 per cent in September 2002 (ZIMSTAT, 2002). 
The expansion in money supply was also attributed to increased public sector 
recourse to financing by the banking sector.
FiGure 5:money Supply Growth and inFlation (1997 - 2002)
Source: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2003
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FiGure 6: money Supply Growth and inFlation (2003 - 2006)
Source: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2007
Concessionary financing in the form of the Productive Sector Finance Facility 
and Export Finance Facility which had been introduced in 2001 continued into 
2002 (IMF, 2003). The interest rate on the facilities was reduced from 30 per 
cent to 15 per cent for productive sectors and from 20 per cent to 5 per cent 
for exporters (IMF, 2002; RBZ, 2002). There was effectively a dual interest 
rate policy, with low interest rates continuing to apply to export and productive 
sectors, while interest rates on consumption borrowing would be market 
determined (IMF, 2002; RBZ, 2002). The Bank rate which had been fixed at 
57.2 per cent in 2001 became irrelevant, against a background of high inflation 
and was thus abandoned as a monetary policy tool (IMF, 2002). 
The period 2004 to 2008 saw the abandonment of indirect monetary control 
as the central bank took a developmental approach. In this regard, the central 
bank embarked on quasi-fiscal activities aimed at evoking the supply side of the 
economy through the provision of concessionary financing to productive sectors 
and direct interventions to public enterprises and local authorities (RBZ, 2004). 
The rapid expansion in broad money underpinned by the central bank’s quasi-
fiscal activities rendered the use of ordinary monetary policy tools ineffective. 
Zimbabwe’s migration to the multi-currency system commenced informally in 
September 2008 and was formalised in February 2009, after the marginalisation 
of the local currency had gathered pace, against the backdrop of hyperinflation. 
The adoption of the multi-currency system resulted in the abandonment of 
the local currency as a medium of exchange, signalling the end of domestic 




Monetary policy is a tool which a nation’s central bank can use to control money 
supply in order to achieve and maintain price stability and other goals such as to 
contribute to economic growth, low levels of unemployment and stable exchange 
rates with other currencies (Friedman, 1967). In another sense, monetary policy 
can be viewed as a process through which a central bank manages money and 
interest rates (Mishkin, 2004; Lipsey and Chrystal, 2007) to influence output 
or inflation. Monetary policy is often conducted through inflation targeting; 
interest rate targeting; reserve money targeting; open market operations; and 
adjustments in the bank rate (rate at which central banks lend money to other 
banks) or reserve requirements (Mishkin, 2004; Lipsey and Chrystal, 2007).
According to Petursson (2007), monetary policy contributes to sustainable 
economic growth and social welfare through its promotion of price stability, 
depending among other things, on clear institutional support from the government. 
Extensive debate, however, still continues both in the academic and policy fields 
about monetary policy and the extent to which a central bank can influence the 
behaviour of real variables using policy instruments at its disposal. 
The notion that monetary policy affects inflation dynamics is anchored in 
Friedman’s dictum that inflation is always everywhere a monetary phenomenon, 
as a result of the quantity of money increasing more than output (Friedman, 
1968; 1972). In the long-term, therefore, the main objective of monetary policy 
should be the attainment of a desirable rate and form of inflation (Friedman, 
1972). Monetarism as a school of thought asserts that money supply is important 
in determining nominal gross domestic product and the level of prices (Brunner 
and Meltzer, 1964; Laidler, 1977; Haffer, 2001; Meltzer, 2004; Jahan and 
Papageorgiou, 2014). The Quantity Theory of Money (QTM), whose building 
block is the equation of exchange, is the theoretical foundation of monetarism. 
The equation of exchange is expressed as follows: MV = PT.
Where: M is the quantity of money
V is the velocity of circulation of money
P is the price level
T is real output
The relationship expressed by the equation of exchange implies that any increase 
in money supply will impact on the price level given that T and V are taken as 
constant. In the long run, changes in money supply lead to an increase in prices. 
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In this regard, the rate of growth in money supply will be equal to rate of increase 
in inflation. The validity of the equation of exchange is not in dispute to both 
Keynesians and Monetarists. Keynesians, however, disagree with Monetarists 
on the assumption that velocity is stable and predictable in the short-term.
The other version of the QTM is the Cambridge Cash-Balance approach, 
which is attributed to Robertson, Pigou, Marshall and Keynes (Humphrey, 2004; 
Suman, 2015). This version postulates that the value of money is determined 
by the supply of and demand for money, in the same manner the price of any 
commodity represents an equilibrium point, where the supply of and demand 
for the commodity are equal.
According to the Cambridge Cash-Balance approach, the public prefers to 
hold a given proportion of nominal income ‘k’ in the form of cash balances. In 
this regard, the cash balance approach can be illustrated as follows:
Md =kPY                                                              
Where:
Md  = money demand
Y   = real national income 
P   = price level
PY = nominal national income
k    = proportion of nominal income held as cash balances
In equilibrium:
Money supply equals money demand: Ms = Md 
Since Md = kPY from equation 1
Ms = kPY                                                                                                     
From equation 2, if ‘k’ and ‘Y’ are held constant, the demand for money for 
transaction purposes increases as the price level increases. An increase in money 
supply with ‘k’ and ‘Y’ constant implies that people increase their expenditure on 
goods and services. Concomitantly, firms respond to the increase in expenditure 
by households by raising the prices of the goods and services they supply.
The ‘k’ in equation 1 and 2 is related to the velocity of circulation of money 
(V) in Fisher’s Equation of Exchange (MV=PT). A higher proportion of nominal 
income held in the form of cash balances, that is, a higher ‘k’ implies that ‘V’ 
declines. A lower ‘k’ implies a higher velocity of circulation of money (V).
Therefore:




Making ‘P’ the dependent variable in equation 2, the cash balance approach can 
be represented as follows:
P = 1/k M/Y            (4)
The Cambridge version of the QTM assumes that ‘k’ and ‘Y’ are constant, 
implying that ‘P’ is determined by the quantity of money (M). In this regard, a 
given change in the quantity of money results in a proportionate change in the 
price level (Hafer, 2001).
The velocity of circulation of money became highly unstable and unpredictable 
during the 1980’s and 1990’s, with the relationship between money supply 
and nominal GDP breaking down. This brought into question the efficacy of 
the QTM and led to the abandonment of monetarism by many of its disciples. 
However, while the quantity theory of money may no longer be appealing to 
many economists, some important aspects of monetarism still remain important 
in modern non-monetarist analyses today and the control of money supply 
growth remains a priority for central banks in the fight against inflation (Bordo 
and Schwatz 2004; Jahan and Papageorigiou, 2014). Bordo and Schwartz (2004) 
summarised their view on monetarism by positing that money influences output 
in the short run and prices in the long run and that it remains an important 
variable in central banks’ quest to achieve price stability.
4.2 Empirical literature review
The impact of monetary policy on inflation dynamics in Zimbabwe has been 
studied in the context of the country’s hyperinflation episode, for example, Mu-
noz (2007); Hanke (2008); and McIndoe (2009). The studies by Munoz (2007) 
and Hanke (2008) were, however, qualitative. The quantitative study by McIn-
doe (2009) utilised an ARDL money demand model to analyse hyperinflation in 
Zimbabwe and found that both speculative behaviour and negative shocks from 
sanctions were not significant in driving hyperinflation, instead, real money bal-
ances were found to be co-integrated with changes in the price level. The find-
ing by McIndoe (2009), however, does not imply a causal relationship between 
real money demand and inflation. 
In a qualitative study, Hanke (2008) argued that the source of Zimbabwe’s 
hyperinflation was the printing of money by the RBZ, where government spent 
and the central bank financed the spending by printing. Hanke (2008) pointed 
out that from January 2005 to May 2007, the RBZ issued currency at a rate 
that even exceeded that of Germany’s Central Bank from January 1921 to May 
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1923, the ramp-up phase of the great German hyperinflation. Robinson (2006), 
corroborated this view by arguing that the RBZ fed hyperinflation in Zimbabwe 
through financing government expenditure by printing money and engaging 
in quasi-fiscal activities. The quasi-fiscal losses comprised subsidies, realised 
exchange losses, and interest costs of open market operations.
Munoz (2007) argued that central bank losses incurred from printing and 
quasi-fiscal activities endangered the control of monetary targets. This is because 
losses led to an injection of money with an immediate impact on domestic 
liquidity and also influenced expectations about future monetary growth. Munoz 
(2007) noted that the escalation of inflation in Zimbabwe from 2005 to 2007 
was fuelled by rapid money growth arising from the central bank’s quasi-fiscal 
activities in financing conventional government budget deficits. The realised 
quasi-fiscal losses of the central bank were financed through money creation 
or issuance of central bank securities, pushing the economy into hyperinflation 
(Munoz, 2007).
There have been similar studies elsewhere in Africa and beyond. Bonga-
Bonga and Kabundi (2009) assessed the effectiveness of monetary policy in 
South Africa using a Structural Vector Error Correction Model (SVECM) to 
characterise the dynamics of inflation to monetary policy shocks. The results of 
the impulse response function showed that positive shocks to monetary policy 
decrease output but do not decrease credit demand and inflation in South Africa. 
In a study on the impact of money and exchange rate fluctuations on inflation 
in Nigeria, Akinbobola (2012) concluded that in the short-term expansion 
in money supply leads to inflation. In the long-term, however, the impact of 
money supply growth on inflation became insignificant. The author advocates 
for the coordination of both monetary policy and fiscal policy to clamp down on 
excessive monetary expansion.
Neugebauer (2013) estimated a Taylor rule model for Brazil to determine the 
degree to which economic growth and inflation are driven by monetary policy. The 
model identifies a strong impact of monetary policy on GDP growth, amounting 
to 25 per cent of total absolute GDP growth changes. On the other hand, inflation 
is explained by a high degree of endogenous feedback with a dominant impact of 
lagged GDP growth vis-à-vis the direct impact of monetary policy. 
Zhang (2013) analysed the dynamics of money and inflation in China using 
multivariate dynamic models in the context of Friedman’s Quantity Theory of 
Money and the monetarist framework of Meltzer. The author concluded that 
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growth in money supply granger-caused inflation for both the short and long-
term. In this regard, Zhang (2013) advocated for the control of monetary growth 
in order to effectively manage and control inflation in China. 
De Grauwe and Polan (2001) studied the relationship between the quantity 
of money and inflation of a 60 country sample for a 30 year series and found 
that money supply growth had a strong and positive relationship with the rate 
of inflation in the long run. This, according to the authors, was explained by 
the inclusion of countries that had experienced hyperinflation. For countries 
with average inflation rates of less than 10 per cent per annum, there was a 
weak relationship between money growth and inflation. The strength of the 
relationship was, however, also influenced by country specific conditions or 
factors. These findings are corroborated by Thornton (2006) who, in a cross 
section and panel data analysis found that in low inflation countries the long 
run relationship between money supply growth and inflation is weak. For high 
inflation countries, however, money growth strongly influenced inflation.       
Bonato (2007) studied the determinants of inflation in Iran for both the short 
and long -term for the period 1988/89-2005/06. The results indicated that money 
played the most prominent role in influencing the long-term general price level, 
compared to other factors such as real output, exchange rate and rate of return 
on money. It was also the author‘s conclusion that in the short run, inflation was 
largely driven by money, albeit with up to four quarter lags. 
The relationship between monetary policy and inflation has also been 
empirically tested in developed countries. Ferroni and Canova (2010) examined 
the contribution of monetary policy shocks to the dynamics of inflation using 
a medium scale structural model estimated with US post-world War II data 
and Bayesian techniques over rolling samples. The results showed a decline in 
inflation volatility and attributed a portion of the changes to monetary policy 
shocks. In addition, the researchers concluded that variations in the level of 
inflation are qualitatively related to monetary policy shocks.  
Vašíček (2009) explored the relationship between monetary policy rules and 
inflation dynamics in small open economies, using evidence from 12 European 
Union (EU) members. The study confirms a significant response of the short-
term nominal interest rate to domestic inflation mostly for the countries using 
inflation targeting. The author concluded that the nexus between the estimated 
monetary policy rules and the sources of the inflation process pointed to the 
viability of the monetary policy setting for price stability. 
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The foregoing empirical literature review motivates the development of a 
standard, simple small open economy inflation model for Zimbabwe, given 
that the country is a price taker on the international market, with constraints 
pertaining to the availability of data. This study is thus a quantitative analysis of 
the role of monetary policy in Zimbabwe’s hyperinflation episode, which bridges 
the gaps in the qualitative analyses of the studies reviewed in this section. 
5. The data, model and methodology
The methodology of this study entails estimating an inflation equation for 
Zimbabwe during the hyperinflation period, based on the empirical and 
theoretical underpinnings reviewed. Following Goujon (2006); Nguyen and 
Nguyen, (2010); Akinbobola (2012); Nguyen, Cavoli and Wilson (2012); and 
Bhattacharya, (2013), a long run inflation model is developed by hypothesising 
that in a small, open price-taking economy, the average price of tradable and 
non-tradable goods influences the general price level.  This can be illustrated as 
follows:
Where:
Pt is the general price level in the economy
PN is the general price for non-tradable goods
PT is the general price for tradables
ϕ is the proportion of tradable goods in the total consumption basket. 
The price of tradable goods is determined by foreign prices (Pt
f) of major 
trading partners and the exchange rate (e) of the local currency vis-a vis that 
of trading partners. The price of tradable goods is therefore, expressed in local 
currency terms as follows:
On the other hand, the price of non-tradable goods is determined by demand 
and supply of money in the economy. In equilibrium, real money supply,                
       equals real money demand,          as illustrated in equation 7:
The demand for real money balances (md) is assumed to be a function of real 





Equation 8 can also be expressed as follows:
Equilibrium in the non-tradable goods sector can be expressed as follows:
β is a scaling parameter which shows the relationship between aggregate demand 
in the economy and the demand for non-tradable goods. 
The expected rate of inflation, assuming adaptive expectations, is determined by 
inflation in the previous period as follows:
A relationship between the general price level, as the dependent variable and 
independent variables is determined through substitution and rearrangement of 
equations 5 to 11 as follows:
Where
Pt is the general price level or consumer price index 
β0 is a constant
Mt
s is money supply
Yt is real output
Pt-1 is the lagged general price level
et is exchange rate
Pt
f is foreign prices
it is nominal interest rate
εt is the error term
Equation 12 is modified to take into account the fact that in the hyperinflation 
period the impact of foreign prices could be captured by the exchange rate 
premium as the country printed money to buy foreign exchange to import 
commodities. In this regard, an increase in foreign prices would result in an 
increase in the demand for foreign exchange to import commodities and this 
would in turn increase the exchange rate premium, as the parallel market was 
the major source of foreign exchange. Foreign prices are, therefore, replaced 
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volume of manufacturing index (VMIt ) as the data on gross domestic product 
is only available on an annual basis. The nominal interest rate is proxied by the 
Treasury bill (TBt ) rate which reflected the direction which the central bank 
wanted interest rates to follow. Equation 12 is now expressed as follows:
The effects of monetary policy on inflation are presumed to be captured by 
the coefficients of money supply and the Treasury bill rate. 
5.1. The unrestricted error correction model
To apply the ARDL approach, the variables in equation 13 are used in an 
Unrestricted Error Correction Model (UECM), following Pesaran, Shin and 
Smith (2001) as follows:
The null hypothesis of no co-integration, that δ0 = δ1 = δ2 = δ3 = δ4 = δ5 = 0, 
against the hypothesis that δ0 ≠ δ1 ≠ δ2 ≠ δ3 ≠ δ4  ≠ δ5 ≠ 0 is tested under this 
methodology. The Wald F Test is used to test for cointegration. Lower and upper 
bounds of significance are established by two adjusted critical values provided 
by Pesaran et al. (2001). In this study, the conclusion was that a long-run 
relationship exists because the computed Wald F-statistic exceeded the upper 
critical value. The null hypothesis of no co-integration could have not been 
rejected if the F-statistic had fallen below the lower critical value. The test is 
inconclusive if the value of the F-statistic lies within the bounds.
6. Empirical ressults and analysis
6.1. Stationarity test results
As a preliminary analysis, the statistical properties of the data were examined 
using unit root tests. The results in Table 1 show that all variables in equation 13 





taBle 1: reSultS oF unit root teStS - auGmented diCKey Fuller teSt
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Notes: * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%
The Wald coefficient test was applied to test for co-integration. The results 
reject the hypothesis of no co-integration as shown by a low probability of 0.00 
in Table 2.
taBle 2: wald CoeFFiCient teSt reSultS
Test Statistic Value Probability
F-statistic 10.58739 0.0000***
Chi-square 42.34955 0.0000***
Notes: * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%
6.2. Estimated coefficients using the ARDL model
The results tabulated in Table 3 indicate that expansionary monetary policy 
and inflation expectations determined hyperinflation developments in the 
Zimbabwean economy for both the short and long run periods. The long run 
impact of expansionary monetary policy of the RBZ is evidenced by the high 
coefficient of 0.41 for money supply. As per a priori expectations an increase in 
money supply resulted in an increase in inflation, thus confirming the positive 
relationship between money supply growth and inflation, which supports many 
empirical studies (for example, Kuijs, 1998; Durevall and Ndungu, 1999; 
Sacerdoti and Xiao, 2001; and Blavy, 2004). In the same vein, higher inflation 
expectations resulted in an increase in the general price level as economic agents 
believed that inflation would continue to soar. The role of inflation expectations 
in influencing price formation is shown by the high and positive coefficient of the 
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lagged consumer price index. In addition, the Treasury bill rate was also found 
to influence price formation in the long run but had an insignificant impact in the 
short run. The coefficient of the proxy for output, the volume of manufacturing 
index, was found to be statistically insignificant for both the short run and long 
run periods. 
taBle 3: ardl model reSultS
Variable Coefficient Standard Error t-Statistic Probability
C -3.034780 1.677255 -1.809372 0.0854
DLOG(CPI(-1)) 0.463095 0.200546 2.309174 0.0317**
DLOG(EXRP) 0.046752 0.041350 1.130656 0.2716
DLOG(M3) 0.326507 0.109493 2.981991 0.0074***
DLOG(VMI) -0.068824 0.302325 -0.227649 0.8222
DLOG(TB) 0.186391 0.130094 1.432740 0.1674
LOG(CPI(-1)) 0.360205 0.144203 2.497898 0.0213**
LOG(EXRP(-1)) -0.045548 0.038572 -1.180872 0.2515
LOG(M3(-1)) 0.405782 0.101599 3.993944 0.0007***
LOG(VMI(-1)) 0.337575 0.279913 1.205999 0.2419
LOG(TB(-1)) 0.252630 0.134528 1.877898 0.0751*
Notes: * significant at 10 per cent, ** significant at 5 per cent, *** significant at 1 per cent
6.3. Error correction model results 
Table 4 shows the estimates of short run coefficients obtained from the error 
correction (ECM) version of the ARDL model. The results indicate that in the 
short run hyperinflation was explained by inflation expectations, money supply 
and the exchange rate premium. The coefficients of these variables are statistically 
significant and also carry the correct signs as per a priori expectations. The 
coefficient of the lagged dependent variable is positive, an indication that the 
short run dynamics of inflation were positively influenced by the past values 
of the consumer price index. Similarly, an increase in money supply and the 
exchange rate premium resulted in an increase in inflation in the short run, as 
indicated by their positive coefficients. 
The short run significance of money supply as a determinant of inflation is 
consistent with the empirical findings of Bonato (2007); Akinbobola (2012); 
and Zhang (2013). The results also confirm the qualitative assessments of 
causes of hyperinflation in Zimbabwe by Munoz (2007) and Hanke (2008). The 
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coefficient of the volume of manufacturing index, a proxy of output, was found 
to be statistically insignificant and had the wrong sign, most probably because 
of the possibilities of inaccuracies of the data. In a hyperinflation environment, 
inflation feeds on itself, while on the other hand, monetary authorities try to chase 
inflation by printing more money to finance economic activity as the real value 
of money continues to decline, thus creating an inflation-money supply spiral. 
This would possibly relegate the influence of changes in output on inflation.
taBle 4: error CorreCtion model reSultS
Variable Coefficient Standard Error t-Statistic Probability
C -0.084403 0.049422 -1.707793 0.1017
DLOG(CPI(-1) 0.527605 0.154556 3.413670 0.0025***
DLOG(M3) 0.305280 0.097685 3.125142 0.0049***
DLOG(VMI(-1) 0.013221 0.277443 0.047651 0.9624
DLOG(TB) 0.213106 0.119745 1.779669 0.0889*
DLOG(EXRP) 0.092508 0.034379 2.690854 0.0133**
DLOG(M3(-1) 0.301057 0.141070 2.134097 0.0442**
EC2(-1) -0.347570 0.147309 -2.359468 0.0276
Adjusted R2   = 0.94      F - statistic (67.6)       Probability (0.00000)      D.W statistic (1.8)
Notes: * significant at 10 per cent, ** significant at 5 per cent, *** significant at 1 per cent
The coefficient of the ECM measures the speed of adjustment of the 
relationship back to equilibrium. In this case, the coefficient of the ECM is 
highly significant and negative and as stated by Banerjee et al. (1998), this is 
also proof that there is a stable relationship between the variables in the model. 
The estimated error correction coefficient of -0.347570, as shown in Table 4 
implies that deviance from the long-term inflation course corrects itself by about 
35 per cent in the following year.
6.4. Pairwise Granger causality tests
The nature of causality between changes in hyperinflation and broad money 
supply is analysed by applying the Granger causality test. Results in Table 5 
show bi-directional causality between hyperinflation and broad money supply. 
This is an indication that excess monetary expansion caused hyper-inflation 
which in turn led to a higher demand for money as the money balances held by 
economic agents continued to be eroded by higher inflation. The central bank 
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was compelled to increase money supply to cope with increased demand for 
money at higher prices, creating an inflation-money supply spiral. 
taBle 5: pairwiSe GranGer CauSality teSt reSultS
Null Hypothesis F-statistic Probability
M3 does not Granger cause CPI 7.75194 0.0025***
CPI does not Granger cause M3 6.68232 0.0049***
Notes: * significant at 10 per cent, ** significant at 5 per cent, *** significant at 1 per cent
6.5. Diagnostic tests
The results from diagnostic tests confirmed that there was no serial correlation 
among the variables after the residuals were subjected to the Breusch-Godfrey 
Serial Correlation LM test. Tests for hetero-skedasticity were undertaken using 
the Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey test and results confirmed that there is no hetero-
skedasticity. Model specification is tested by subjecting the residuals to the 
Ramsey RESET test and the results indicate that the model is well specified. 
6.6. Stability of model
Parameter stability is assessed by applying the cumulative sum of the recursive 
residuals (CUSUM) test, following Pesaran and Pesaran (1997), while the 
CUSUM of square (CUSUMSQ) test proposed by Brown et al. (1975), is applied 
to the residuals to test for parameter constancy. The CUSUM and CUSUMSQ 
tests have the advantage that unlike the Chow test that require the specification 
of the structural break points, they can be utilised without a priori knowledge of 
the exact dates the structural breaks occurred. 
The null hypothesis being tested, in both the CUSUM and CUSUMSQ, is that 
all coefficients are stable. If either of the parallel lines in the plots is crossed, 
the null hypothesis of parameter stability is rejected at the 5 percent level of 
significance. In Figure 7 and 8, the plots of the CUSUM and CUSMSQ statistics 
are confined within the 5 percent critical value bounds and this indicates the 
stability of the coefficients. In this regard, the parameters of the model do not 
have any structural instability.
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FiGure 7: plot oF Cumulative Sum oF reCurSive reSidualS
FiGure 8: plot oF Cumulative Sum oF SquareS oF reCurSive reSidualS
7. Summary and policy recommendations
The high significance of broad money and lagged consumer price index in ex-
plaining the variation of inflation during the study period confirmed that hyper-
inflation in Zimbabwe was largely caused by expansionary monetary policy and 
inflation expectations. The unrestrained printing of money by the central bank 
of Zimbabwe led to an exponential growth in money supply feeding into the 
inflation spiral. As inflation got out of control, high inflation expectations were 
induced resulting in inflation feeding on itself. A money supply growth-infla-
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tion spiral was created, resulting in even higher levels of inflation. As inflation 
spiralled out of control the amount of money in circulation became increasingly 
short of the requirements to finance economic activity, resulting in pressure on 
the central bank to print more money. 
Zimbabwe’s hyperinflation episode brings to the fore the importance of 
ensuring that a country has strong institutional arrangements that play a crucial 
role in influencing the monetary policy process in a manner that ensures that 
there is price stability. At the centre of the institutional arrangements is the issue 
of central bank independence. Central bank independence refers to the freedom 
of the central bank to formulate and implement monetary policy without undue 
influence from politicians or central government (Woolley, 1984; Fraser, 1994; 
Walsh, 2003).
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